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The relationship of new weapons in the American arsenal to research and development 
(R&D) has often been assumed to be characterized by a linear model of the dependence of 
technology upon science. According to this model, basic research leads to new scientific knowledge, 
which in tum is applied to the end of developing new technologies. The linear model has a long 
history, but it has been specially emphasized since World War II by scientists justifying support for 
basic research on grounds of its indispensability to the advance of civilian and military technology. 
The martial claims of the linear model were spectacularly verified by the success of the 
Manhattan Project. Here was a revolutionary new weapon-the atomic bomb--that had originated 
in the research of physicists into the structure of the nucleus, a subject of esoteric interest with little 
if any likely practical utility. Or so it had seemed until the discovery of nuclear fission, in 1938. 
After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, physicists as well as other advocates of science insisted that the 
highly technical weapons of the war-not only the atomic bomb but radar, rockets, and myriad other 
devices-had depleted the reservoir of basic knowledge. The reservoir had to be refilled, not least 
for the sake of national security, with federal programs in support of basic research and training in 
areas pertinent to national defense. l 
Thus, in the name of national security, a vast federal R&D structure was established in the 
postwar years. A key feature of this structure was the support provided to civilian scientists in 
extragovernmental institutions by new military or militarily relevant agencies, notably the Office of 
Naval Research, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, and the Atomic Energy Commission, 
and by the military's longstanding technical bureaus (for example, the Army Signal Corps or the 
Navy Bureau of Ordnance). In addition, a far-flung scientific advisory apparatus was created, linking 
the military with scientists from academia and industry. For almost a quarter century after 1945, 
defense research expenditures rose virtually exponentially even in constant dollars, accounting 
through 1960 for 80% or more of the entire federal R&D budget. In 1950, it was estimated that there 
were 15,000 defense research projects; in the early 1960s, perhaps 80,000.2 With the rise of the 
space program and the disillusion with the military attendant upon the war in Vietnam, the fraction 
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of federal R&D monies devoted to defense fell below 50% by the mid-1970s, but it has now 
recovered to almost 70% of a federal R&D budget that totals some $57 billion. 
Federal support of R&D has, of course, produced a cornucopia of strategic and tactical 
weapons, including thermonuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles, supersonic 
aircraft and smart bombs, surveillance satellites and nuclear-powered submarines. However, the 
historical facts of military R&D call the linear model into severe question. On average, no more 
than-and in recent years much less than-about 5% of the defense research budget has gone for 
basic research.3 The other 95% or more has been devoted to applied research, development, and 
testing. The point here is not that the government has gotten what it has paid for but that it has paid 
for activities likely to result in things that it wanted-in this case, innovative weapons systems. 
In the early 1970s, the Defense Department completed a study of the origins of twenty major 
weapons systems between 1945 and 1965. Published as Project Hindsight, the study concluded that 
fewer than one percent of the innovations required for the systems had originated in undirected basic 
scientific research carried out after 1945. Another eight percent were found to have their roots in 
research directed to defense or civilian needs. The vast majority-91 %- had emerged from 
programs aimed at particular technological developments.4 Critics faulted the study for 
shortsightedness: the success of the martially utilitarian research had depended strongly upon work 
in the basic sciences stretching back a century or more. To a great extent, the critics were right. 
However, the issue is not the obvious one that there can be no applied science without a science to 
apply. It is, rather, that the major advances in weapons systems were not fueled by compelling new 
progress in the self-determined basic sciences. They resulted from deliberate attempts by the 
defense establishment to call forth such advances by projecting slightly beyond what was known to 
what might be desired.s 
The interplay between the known and the desired suggests that the linear model might 
perhaps be replaced by something more akin to a feedback model, where technical possibilities 
interact with strategic or tactical needs, and definitions of such needs shape the generation of 
technical possibilities. Herbert York, the director of the Livermore Laboratory from its inception, in 
1952, to 1958, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering from 1958 to 1961, and both a 
defense adviser and arms-control activist afterwards, has recalled how the development of the 
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advisory committee apparatus fostered such a feedback relationship: 
Participation in these committees led to a remarkable and important synergism. I, and other 
laboratory leaders-both non-profit and industrial-brought to these committees and the 
military services to whom they reported fresh infonnation about what we were doing and 
reliable projections of where it might lead. In return we developed an understanding of the 
likely characteristics of future military requirements that was far more accurate and timely than 
would otherwise have been the case. Equally important, we also acquired a first-hand working 
knowledge of the doctrines and strategies underlying our development and procurement plans, 
knowledge which we could have obtained no other way, knowledge which each of us used to 
steer the course of the programs for which we were responsible.6 
A crucial assumption of the feedback model is that there exists a set of military requirements 
that is at least to some degree independent of technological possibilities. This assumption penneates 
the literature on anns control and the anns race, where it is taken for granted that innovations in 
strategic weapons originate in response to the actions of the Soviet Union and/or to needs dictated by 
strategic doctrine. Graham T. Allison and Frederic Morton have observed: "A careful review of the 
literature of anns control and strategy finds no important issue less studied than the question of what 
detennines the number and character of the weapons in American and Soviet force postures. Anns-
control analysts have persistently and systematically neglected the processes by which nations 
develop and procure weapons. Rather than recognizing the weapons-acquisition process as a central 
piece of the anns-control puzzle, the literature has substituted a simplification of the problem. 
According to this simplification, a nation's arsenal of weapons is viewed as the product of 
governmental choices made on the grounds of calculations about national strategic objectives and 
doctrines. ,,7 
The assumption that technological effort proceeds to a significant extent from doctrinal 
dictates would seem questionable. For example, the stockpiling of nuclear weapons-and one might 
add the development of the hydrogen bomb-in the decade following World War II derived less 
from rigorous calculations of strategic needs than it did from a commitment to overwhelm the 
Soviets if necessary with means offered by nuclear and thennonuclear technology. 8 York has 
written of the strategic anns race that "in the large majority of cases the initiative has been in our 
hands," citing not only the atomic bomb but intercontinental bombers and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles. No rigorous calculation lay behind the decision, in the early 1950s, to require the 
Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile to deliver a one-megaton thennonuclear warhead. Why one 
megaton? "The answer is," York has recalled, "because and only because one million is a 
particularly round number in our culture. We picked a one-megaton yield for the Atlas warhead for 
the same reason that everyone speaks of rich men as being millionaires and never as being 
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tenmillionaires or one-hundred-thousand millionaires. It really was that mystical, and I was one of 
the mystics. ,,9 
The consequences of the choice, however, were considerable. The thermonuclear size of the 
payload permitted a relaxation of accuracy for the missile well below what would have been required 
with a nuclear weapon. And the one-megaton figure meant that a missile could be lighter than one 
powerful enough to deliver a warhead of higher yield. The allowance of a larger targeting error and 
lighter weight permitted the development of the first ICBM a year or two faster than would have 
been possible otherwise, thus avoiding a worse furor over the alleged missile gap of 1958-1960 than 
the one that actually erupted. In retrospect, the U.S. ICBM program seemed wisely designed to 
counter the Soviet initiative in the area. In this context, one can well understand the observation of 
Harvey Brooks, a veteran of scientific advising to the government, that "military requirements tend 
to become after-the-fact rationalizations of technical ideas cooked up at a relatively low level in the 
military-technical-contractor bureaucracy." 10 
* * * * * * 
One can hardly expect strategic weapons innovations to be responses to real Soviet actions 
or the doctrines that they stimulate. As Allison and Morris note, "weapons are deployed only after a 
long process of research, design, and development." Lags of ten to fifteen years are not uncommon 
between the inauguration of weapons research programs and the fonnulation of the strategic doctrine 
in which the weapons will figure, not to mention the acquisition of knowledge concerning the actual 
Soviet capabilities against which they will operate. Decisions concerning R&D in strategic weapons 
necessarily, therefore, involve judgments concerning expectations of Soviet actions, or possible 
actions. 11 For this reason, a good deal of defense R&D is conducted to avoid technological surprise. 
It is also pursued to maintain a qualitative superiority in weapons, in conformity with the 
longstanding U.S. policy of relying on technological sophistication and power to offset the Soviet 
advantages in conventional forces, particularly large standing annies. 
However, what the Soviets might do strategically, what surprises they might generate, what 
constitutes qualitative superiority-all these criteria hinge on deliberations that inevitably involve 
the patrons and practitioners of defense R&D. Little is known of a systematic nature about the role 
that the defense research community plays, in interaction with other groups, to detennine the 
nation's strategic defense posture. To the end of devising a systematic approach to the issue, I would 
like to suggest here that several key areas qualify as categories for analysis: industrial defense 
contractors; the government's own weapons laboratories; the defense bureaucracy, particularly the 
individual armed services; and the general politics of national security.12 
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The vested interest of defense contractors in the arms race can easily be measured in terms 
of profits and jobs. Defense-oriented industries now employ more than five million people, some 
five percent of the labor force (another five percent comprises members of the armed services, 
civilian employees of the services, and employees of defense agencies). 13 Nevertheless, defense 
contractors are clearly less crucial to the overall economy than they are to themselves, including 
their employees and stockholders, their Congressional representatives, and the Department of 
Defense, with which they are symbiotically linked in a relationship of mutual dependence. In the 
weapons area, what comends them to DOD is their ability to satisfy its understanding of its missions. 
As both the contractors and the Defense Department well know, that ability hinges heavily on R&D, 
a point expressed by the fact that since 1945 the ratio of defense R&D to weapons acquisition costs 
have generally risen from five percent to a peak of over fifty percent and have amounted to between 
twenty-five and thirty percent in recent years. 14 
Industrial research accounted for almost half of the weapons innovations examined in 
Project Hindsight, universities (including contract research centers) for only about an eighth. 
Industry is the largest performer of overall federally sponsored research and development. In 1970, 
52 cents of the federal R&D dollar went to industrial firms, compared with 16 cents to universities 
and colleges; in 1980, the industrial share was 48 cents, compared with 21 cents to colleges and 
universities. IS The industrial share of the defense R&D dollar is still higher-amounting to 70 cents 
in the 1980s (within the industrial sector, twenty-five major firms receive about 75% of defense 
R&D contract funds). In recent years, these monies have been supplemented by the Defense 
Department's Independent Research & Development program. Under this program, DOD supplies 
overhead payments on procurement contracts that industrial firms can use for militarily-relevant 
research projects of their own initiation. On average, the amount available to industry comes to 
about three percent of their total sales to DOD. In 1982, typically, the major defense contractors 
spent about $4.5 billion on R&D projects that they initiated and they received reimbursements under 
the IR&D program of about $2 billion-a sum exceeding the total budget that year of the National 
Science Foundation.16 
Not surprisingly, a hefty fraction of the nation's scientists and engineers in fields pertinent to 
the military are employed in defense-related industries. In 1982, defense employment involved 
about eleven percent of mathematicians and statisticians outside of academia; twenty percent of 
posture. In recent years, these finns have advanced new strategies, tactics, and ideas about innovative weapons systems. 
They have also provided an important home for defense intellectuals associated with the out-of-government party and a 
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electrical engineers; twenty-five percent of physicists; and almost forty percent of aeronuatical and 
astronautical engineers.17 Thus, a stake in weapons innovation is to be found among a sizable 
segment of the country's technical community, clearly a far larger fraction of the relevant technical 
work force than the fraction of the total labor force found in the defense industry. The implications 
for weapons policy-making are considerable, since scientists and engineers constitute a strategic elite 
with the ability, by virtue of their technical expertise, to influence policy far out of proportion to 
their absolute numbers. 
A major portion of defense R&D contracts go to large rather than small manufacturing firms. 
For example, in fiscal 1977 almost half of the funds spent on defense research and development went 
to eight companies. For a variety of reasons-including desire for a successful track record, 
confidence in the firm's stability, and the like-the Defense Department prefers to deal with large 
firms. On their part, only the large firms can afford to play in the defense research game. The 
procedural regulations that govern R&D as well as procurement relationships between the Pentagon 
and its suppliers occupy 3,000 pages. Contractor proposals are even more voluminous, with some 
coming to 26,000 pages and involving 1,600 people in their preparation. IS The large firms maintain 
sizable R&D capabilities, because with "Rtf-and especially "D"-comes a technical knowhow that 
provides the firm with an advantage in seeking production contracts. Thus, firms with research 
contracts are naturally impelled to push for what production contracts require-weapons acquisition 
and deployment-and they command significant lobbying power for accomplishing their purposes in 
the executive and legislative branches of the government. 
One can point to several outstanding examples of the process, starting with the nuclear-
powered airplane, research on which originated in 1946 under high priority. A succession of review 
committees found the project increasingly dubious on technical grounds. Nevertheless, key 
industrial contractors-notably General Electric, Pratt and Whitney, and the Convair Corporation-
lobbied hard, though unsuccessfully, after Sputnik to transform the effort into a full fiight-
development program. A similar but more sustained effort surrounded the ill-fated B-70 bomber, 
which the Air Force badly wanted in the late 1950s and which it touted as imperative to offset the 
Soviet missile capability. In 1957, contracts were awarded to North American Aviation, in southern 
California, to develop the B-70 by building several prototypes. In 1959, by which time $300 million 
had been spent, the Eisenhower administration decided to scale back the B-70, since the U.S. ICBM 
program was coming along well enough to make the bomber unnecessary. During the Kennedy 
administration, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara reduced the program still further, though 
not without a fierce battle. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors resolved that the 
administration should reinvigorate the program, noting that "much of the work of constructing these 
bombers would be done by Los Angeles area concerns."19 
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Staller, eds., The Economic Consequences of Military Spending in the United States and the Soviet Union (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
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The industrial proponents of the B-70 and of nuclear-powered aircraft found powerful allies 
in the Congress among air-power advocates as well as representatives of their own states and 
districts. Such issues can draw together otherwise anomalous coalitions. For example, Carl Vinson, 
a Georgia Democrat and the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, railed against the 
B- 70 cutbacks, and so did Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, a brigadier general in the Air Force 
Reserve as well as a conservative Republican, and Senator Qair Engle of California, another Air 
Force Reserve officer, who was also a liberal Democrat. 20 Indeed, the power of defense contractors 
in the weapons development process is grounded in complicated linkages that cut across regional, 
partisan, and ideological lines and that abound among major industrial firms, the individual armed 
services, and the Congress. 
However, policy initiatives in the strategic weapons area tend to originate within the 
executive branch, particularly in the interaction between the defense bureacuracy and the research 
community. York has observed that the scientific advisory system makes it possible for "the most 
exuberant and persuasive of our technologists to promote ideas and sell hardware that often take us 
far beyond the point that mere prudence requires. ,,21 (In the 1950s, the exuberant technologists could 
be spokesmen for corporate interests; conflict of interest standards then were less strict than they 
became later.) However, many of the exuberant technologists are to be found not only in industry 
but in the government's own armed-service service and civilian weapons laboratories. Defense 
laboratories were responsible for almost forty percent of the weapons innovations surveyed by 
Project Hindsight. In recent years, they have been receiving approximately a quarter of defense R&D 
monies and, like industrial R&D contractors, they have a bureaucratic stake in sustaining the system 
of weapons innovation.22 Yet their enthusiasm for new weapons technologies no doubt also 
expresses some combination of professional ambition or opportunism, ideological conviction or 
concern for national security-and a taste for technical sweetness, a powerful technological drive, a 
consuming desire to bend the resources of the state to satisfy a Promethean will. 
Salient examples come to mind from the rolls of the postwar defense research and advisory 
establishment. Wernher von Braun, consumed by the aim of building giant rockets and 
accomplishing space flight, transmuted his orbital ambitions into imperatives of postwar American 
national security. He cared a good deal more about bigger rockets than about military needs, but, 
unable to sell adventures into space, he hawked his technological wares to the American military just 
as he had done to Hitler. "All I really want is a rich uncle," he told T. Keith Glennan, the NASA 
administrator.23 Edward Teller was a tireless zealot of thermonuclear weapons long before the first 
atomic bomb was developed ... He insisted on concentrating on a thermonuclear device at Los Alamos 
during the war and feverishly advanced the project with still greater comniitmentin thelate 1940s. 
Teller's technological drive, inflamed more than von Braun's by a fierce anti-Communism, was 
perhaps more persistent and longstanding. 
20. Ibid., pp. 55-6. 
21. Ibid., pp. 11-12; York, "Autobiography," chap. VII, pp. 3-4. 
22. Kranzberg, "Science, Technology, and Warfare," in Wright and Paszek, eds., Science, Technology, and Warfare, pp. 
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Military Research and Development, 1984, p.7 
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Yet behind the master weapons builders has stood-and continues to stand-a sizable cadre 
of scientists and engineers, the inhabitants of the weapons and weapons-related laboratories. They 
may be architects of Armageddon, but they are not so much consumed by overarching technological 
visions as absorbed in particular-and often particularly challenging-technical tasks. They live 
and work in a classified world which, while highly compartmentalized and hierarchical, no doubt has 
some type of structure of prestige and rewards for technical accomplishment. They derive direct 
pleasure from the technical elegance of the systems on which they work. A consultant to one of the 
major weapons laboratories recently remarked, "When I see one of those nuclear weapons, compact 
and sophisticated in its gleaming coat, I think to myself that it is truly beautiful. It's only when I 
remind myself what it can do that I realize how utterly ugly it really is. ,,24 
Such ugliness does not ordinarily deter the Promethean will that is rationalized by high 
national purpose. Herbert York has recalled that during his directorship of Livermore, he initiated 
research outside the design and development of particular thermonuclear weapons. The auxiliary 
projects included basic research in magnetic fusion and neutron cross-sections and applied work 
towards fashioning fission and fusion warheads at extremes of size, weight, and yield without regard 
to specific military requirements. York added: 
I had two complementary benefits in mind in pushing this philosophy. First, it seemed to be the 
best way to assure continuing American superiority in nuclear weaponry. Second, it provided 
the kind of intellectual stimulus and prospect for adventure that young scientists usually find 
only in basic research .... 
This approach meant that the laboratory leadership had to engage in a continual effort 
to sell its ideas, to anticipate military requirements, and to suggest to the US military ways in 
which its new designs could be used to enhance military preparedness and better support our 
general nuclear strategy. If we had waited for Washington to tell us exactly what was needed in 
terms of dimensions, yield, special output, or other technical parameters, such selling would not 
have been necessary, but that is not the way we went about our business at Livermore, nor did 
they do things that way at Los Alamos either, especially after we brought competition onto the 
nuclear scene. 
Some observers have criticized the laboratories for engaging in this selling activity. 
They charge that it pushes the nuclear arms race further and faster than would otherwise be the 
case. That is certainly true, but it is also true that it resulted in the US military having better 
weapons, and better in this sense does not usually mean 'bigger and more destructive' as is 
frequently charged. Better.more often means better adapted to a given delivery system, more 
appropriate to some specific purpose and therefore frequently smaller and producing less 
collateral damage, safer against accidents, and so on.25 
In later years, those auxiliary programs came to include high-energy beams for defensive 
weapons and free-electron lasers, both of which figure importantly in President Reagan's Strategic 
24. Author's interview with the consultant, who would prefer to remain anonymous. See York, Race to Oblivion, 
pp.234-35. 
25. York, "Autobiography," chap. VI, pp. 28-29. 
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Defense Initiative. 26 Not surprisingly, the Livennore Laboratory seems to have played an important 
role in the origins of SDI. (The presence of technocratic ambition in the anns race, York has noted, 
is not confined to the United States. On a visit to the SALT delegation in Geneva, he asked one of 
the Soviet delegates why Russia had initiated their anti-satellite program. The Soviets, York 
remarked, must have known that this action would stimulate a U.S. response. The Soviet delegate 
replied in essence: "You know how it is. You have the same thing in your country. Some young 
ambitious technicians get hold of an idea they believe is both practical and important and they 
promote it and push it until finally the authorities let them go ahead with it.,,)27 
In the United States, the authorities not only respond to but often encourage the 
technological drummers. Interservice rivalry fosters marriages of mutual advantage between the 
individual anned services and the enthusiasts of the weapons laboratories. By sponsoring R&D 
programs in diverse weapons, each service maintains rights in the mission areas that the weapons 
define. In the early 1950s, the anned services initiated development of six different missiles. Two 
were intennediate range ballistic missiles-the Air Force's Thor and the Anny's Jupiter, which was 
forged by Wemher von Braun's team at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. In tenns of 
range, accuracy, warhead size, and engines, the Jupiter was virtually identical to the Thor. 
Nevertheless, von Braun joined forces with high Anny officials and saw to it that the Jupiter was 
brought to completion and even deployed.28 
York has commented on the general missile duplication issue: 
We spent about twice as much money and we employed about twice as many people on these 
development programs as we should have. . .. From the point of view of anns control and the 
anns race, these excesses in dollars and people also had serious consequences. The extra 
organizations and the extra people resulted in a larger constituency favoring weapons 
development. This larger constituency in tum strengthened those forces in the Congress 'which 
hear the farthest drum before the cry of a hungry child,' and consequently the whole anns race 
spiraled faster than before. Many of the leaders within this overexpanded missile industry 
correctly foresaw that they would be in trouble when all of these concurrent crash development 
programs finally resulted in some deployed hardware. They rightly anticipated that any 
follow-on developments would have a very hard time competing with the even larger funds 
needed for such deployments, and they provided some of the most strident voices among those 
proclaiming the 'missile gap' of the 1958-60 period.29 
In the larger arena of national security, military R&D becomes an instrument of political 
purpose. "What factions may give up in anns control agreements, they have often sought to regain 
through renewed emphasis on R&D. Anns control advocates had hoped that the partial nuclear test 
ban treaty of 1963 would slow down the nuclear anns race, but the price of ratification in the Senate 
26. Ibid., chap. VI, pp. 30-31. 
27. Ibid., chap. XV, pp. 26-27. 
28. York, Race to Oblivion, pp. 83-84; See Michael Annacost, The Politics o[Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter 
Controversy (New York: Columbia U. Press, 1969). 
29. York, Race to Oblivion, pp. 102-104. 
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was a commitment to maintain a test program sufficient to "satisfy all our military requirements." 
Since underground tests were more complicated than atmospheric ones, the Atomic Energy 
Commission felt compelled to conduct tests at a faster pace and on a more regular basis than it had 
in the 1950s. In the eighteen years before the test ban, the United States and the Soviet Union had 
conducted 469 nuclear tests; in the ten years after the treaty, 424.30 
In the 1950s, the United States began research and development on an anti-ballistic missile 
system (ABM)-a project that was given to the Army in 1958 and that the Army was determined to 
sustain after authority over all10ng-range offensive missiles was awarded to the Air Force. The aim 
in those days was missiles that would rise to attack and destroy incoming Soviet warheads. The 
effort produced, first, the Nike Zeus and the Nike X, both of which were declared inadequate for 
deployment by technical review boards. The boards, however, recommended continued ABM R&D, 
stressing among other things the necessity of insuring against technological surprise. The R&D led 
to new ABM systems-Sentinel, then Safeguard-with the latter given limited deployment. When 
this piggyback program was abandoned with the ratification of SALT I in 1972, hawks insisted on 
stepping up the development of the B-1 bomber and the deployment of the Trident submarine as well 
as of multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV). Ratification was also 
accompanied by exhortations to increase military R&D of both an offensive and defensive natureY 
Such R&D seems to have led to an acceleration of what is known as the "qualitative arms race"-
that is, the qualitative improvement of offensive systems within the limits of the treaty. It was also, 
no doubt, responsible for advancing ABM research to the point where its advocates could prevail 
upon President Ronald Reagan to embrace the Strategic Defense Initiative. 
There is perhaps no more telling example of the interaction of laboratory ambitions, 
interservice rivalry, and the politics of national security than MIRV. MIRV originated in response 
not to the reality of but to the apprehension of a possible Soviet ABM system that might first be 
deployed on a limited basis but later extended throughout Russia. As John Foster, the Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering, testified to Congress in the 1960s: "Our current effort to get a 
MIRV capability on our missiles is not reacting to a Soviet capability so much as it is moving ahead 
again to make sure that whatever they do of the possible things that we can imagine they might do, 
we will be prepared." Technically, MIRV began with the idea of overwhelming an ABM by 
incorporating several warheads on a single missile so that they would fall in a cluster on the target. 
That scheme quickly evolved into the targeting of each warhead independently. The laboratories 
pushed for the development and deployment of MIRV. The idea was technically sweet, it worked, 
and it promised to increase strategic offensive power at relatively little COSt.32 
30. York, Race to Oblivion, p.4S; Brooks, "The Military Innovation System and the Qualitative Arms Race"; Allison and 
Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control"; Long, "Arms Control from the Perspective of the 1970s," in Long and Rathjens, 
eds., Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control, pp. 82, 99, 12. 
31. Allison and Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control"; Long, "Arms Control from the Perspective of the 1970s"; 
Brooks, "The Military Innovation System and the Qualitative Arms Race," in Long and Rathjens, eds., Arms, Defense 
Policy, and Arms Control, pp. 12,82,99,114-17 
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The Air Force and the Navy, both now rivals in the structure of nuclear deterrence, embraced 
it because the strategic firepower of each would be increased. Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara perceived several advantages in MIRV. The technology countered Air Force demands 
for a new strategic bomber and an expanded missile force. It neutralized the charges of critics at 
home that the United States was risking vulnerability to Soviet forces and it was actually a high-
confidence means of buffering any future Soviet strategic threat, including an ABM. Finally, its 
clear-cut capacity for overwhelming any Soviet ABM equipped McNamara with a powerful 
argument against the development and deployment, then being urged, of a major American ABM 
system. It should not be surprising that, given the multiple reasons for multiple warheads, the 
deployment of MIRVs continued even after SALT I imposed severe limitations on a Soviet ABM. 
Indeed, half as many more missiles were MIRVed in the three years after SALT I than in the period 
before the treaty. 33 
The post-SALT acceleration of the arms race has shaken many arms-control advocates. A 
number of them have begun to wonder whether arms-control agreements, while carving out islands 
of non-competition, may only divert the strategic weapons race elsewhere in the vast remaining sea 
of technical possibilities. As York has noted, "The United States cannot maintain its qualitative 
edge without an aggressive R&D establishment that pushes against the technological frontiers 
without waiting to be asked." Yet R&D conducted to sustain U.S. qualitative superiority in weapons 
can all too easily intensify the qualitative arms race or even destabilize Soviet-American relations, 
since weapons systems not only express but can cause differences between nation-states.34 
And behind the establishment's aggressiveness lie the professional ambitions in the 
laboratories, the economic interests of the defense firms, and the appeal of R&D to factions in 
Congress and the Executive Branch as an instrument in the competiton for doctrinal advantage. 
With such charged connections, defense R&D has often seemed to be less a response to assessments 
of Soviet behavior and more a reaction in one part of the American defense establishment to 
apprehensions generated in another. York has noted that the "early developments of MIRV and 
ABM were not primarily the results of any careful operations analysis or anything that might be 
called provocation by the other side," adding, "Rather, they were largely the result of a continuously 
reciprocating process consisting of a technological challenge put out by the designers of our defense 
and accepted by the designers of our offense, then followed by a similar challenge/response sequence 
in the reverse direction." The process thus yields a grimly paradoxical dynamic-one that Jerome 
Wiesner, the former science advisor to President John F. Kennedy, once capsuled: "We're in an 
arms race with ourselves-and we're winning.,,35 
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